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Abstract
In Part 1 of this paper, we discussed emerging evidence suggesting that a general psychopathology or ‘p’ factor
underlying the various forms of psychopathology should be conceptualized in terms of the absence of resilience,
that is, the absence of positive reappraisal mechanisms when faced with adversity. These impairments in the
capacity for positive reappraisal seem to provide a comprehensive explanation for the association between
the p factor and comorbidity, future caseness, and the ‘hard-to-reach’ character of many patients with severe
personality pathology, most notably borderline personality disorder (BPD). In this, the second part of the paper, we
trace the development of the absence of resilience to disruptions in the emergence of human social communication,
based on recent evolutionary and developmental psychopathology accounts. We argue that BPD and related disorders
may be reconceptualized as a form of social understanding in which epistemic hypervigilance, distrust
or outright epistemic freezing is an adaptive consequence of the social learning environment. Negative
appraisal mechanisms become overriding, particularly in situations of attachment stress. This constitutes a
shift towards a more socially oriented perspective on personality psychopathology in which the absence
of psychological resilience is seen as a learned response to the transmission of social knowledge. This shift
in our views has also forced us to reconsider the role of attachment in BPD. The implications for prevention
and intervention of this novel approach are discussed.
Keywords: Borderline personality disorder, Resilience, Epistemic trust, Mentalizing, Attachment,
Psychopathology
Background
Bringing together the threads of the argument we built
in Part 1 of this paper, we propose that the common
variance revealed by bi-factor studies of psychopathology
indicates a shared variance in resisting socially expect-
able adversity. Moreover, persistent psychological dis-
tress associated with personality disorder (PD) has as a
common element diagnostic criteria that we may par-
ticularly expect to see in BPD, making BPD features the
core features linked to persistence of psychiatric prob-
lems. So far, we have outlined a model that inverses this
vulnerability from one focused on the common charac-
teristics of the pathological condition to an alternative
perspective that highlights the absence of resilience as
the shared cause. Following Kalisch et al.’s persuasive
model of resilience [1], we argued that the persistence of
psychopathology, as observed prototypically in BPD,
results from a pervasive limitation on the appraisal of
stressful social experience, which could be linked to
limitations in the capacity to mentalize.
What may explain this absence of capacity to
reappraise stressful social experiences? Here, recent evo-
lutionary and developmental accounts of the emergence
of epistemic trust in humans may provide important
answers. These views also, as we will demonstrate,
necessitate a shift in our perspective on the role of
* Correspondence: p.fonagy@ucl.ac.uk
1Research Department of Clinical, Educational and Health Psychology,
University College London, London, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Fonagy et al. Borderline Personality Disorder and Emotion Dysregulation  (2017) 4:9 
DOI 10.1186/s40479-017-0062-8
attachment in BPD. Put briefly, the theory of epistemic
trust posits that the human infant – most usually first
within the context of early attachment relationships – is
instinctively inclined to develop openness to the recep-
tion of social communications from their primary care-
givers. Stated otherwise, epistemic trust is an adaptation
allowing the infant to receive social knowledge from
their better-informed elders [2], enabling them to benefit
from the complex edifice of human knowledge that their
immediate culture has available to them.
There are two possible bases on which cultural
knowledge can be accepted by a learner as credible:
they can either work it out for themselves (which is
time-consuming, difficult, and often impossible) or
they can rely on the epistemic trust they have in the
authority of the communicator [3, 4]. Trusting the
communicator means that the learner does not have
to go back to first principles each time they encoun-
ter novelty: a strange-looking tool without a self-
evident purpose is accepted as being used as
described by a trusted elder, because they have said
so [5]. Being told in this way is enough, and saves an
awful lot of time and effort, and indeed possibly
allows the infant to grow up and build upon or
revolutionize the use of the tool in question. This
capacity to teach and learn social knowledge largely
underpins the evolution of human culture [6]: it has
been proposed that this form of cultural evolution,
based on the transmission of knowledge via epistemi-
cally trusted communication, emerged during the late
Pleistocene era [7].
The internalization of knowledge about the social
world constitutes a particular kind of learning: it in-
volves encoding the piece of knowledge as signifi-
cant, relevant to the recipient and socially
generalizable – that is, as an accepted and reusable
piece of cultural currency. This specific form of
learning is stimulated by ostensive cues generated by
the communicator [8, 9]. Such cues trigger a peda-
gogic stance in the recipient, priming them to regard
forthcoming communications as significant. Human
infants display species-specific sensitivity and defer-
ence to non-verbal ostensive cues, such as eye con-
tact, turn-taking contingent reactivity, being called
by their name, and the use of a special tone of voice
(‘motherese’) by the communicator [10, 11]. These
ostensive cues have in common the quality that the
recipient is recognized as a subjective, agentive self.
Once epistemic trust is stimulated in this way, the
channel for the transmission of knowledge is opened.
Mimicry may be protected by human evolution
because it generates epistemic trust, inevitably sig-
nalling recognition in the child by the imitating
adult. A social smile (recognition of the self by the
other) probably increases the tendency for imitation
because the smile generates epistemic trust and
opens the communication channel to receive
knowledge.
It has been argued that this mechanism for opening
the epistemic channel exists because it cannot be left
open by default: it is adaptive for humans to adopt a
position of epistemic vigilance unless they are reassured
that it is safe to do otherwise [4, 5]. The notion that chil-
dren are promiscuously credulous to those around them
has been disproved by ample evidence suggesting the
ways in which dubious social signifiers and poor past
performance may render a social communicator suspect
and their assertions about the world regarded with scep-
ticism [12, 13]. Epistemic vigilance is a necessary tool to
protect against misinformation, whether as a conse-
quence of malicious intent or incompetence on the part
of the communicator [4]. Therefore, although the pur-
pose of epistemic trust is the transmission of data, its
application is a highly psychological and relational
process, dependent on calculations about who is trust-
worthy, authoritative and knowledgeable –in other
words, about whose information is worthy of being
encoded as relevant and culturally significant to the self.
Epistemic mistrust and developmental
psychopathology
In situations where a young learner’s early environment
is heavily populated by unreliable communicators, the
opening of epistemic trust becomes problematic: it may
be more adaptive to remain persistently vigilant about,
or even closed off to, the communication of social know-
ledge. In the face of an abusive and hostile caregiver,
whose intentions towards the infant or child are not be-
nign, epistemic mistrust becomes entrenched as an ap-
propriate adaptation that has been prepared by natural
selection.
Consistent with these assumptions, an accumulating
body of evidence indicates that childhood maltreatment,
broadly defined, can have a negative impact on several
aspects of social-cognitive competencies in individuals
who have not yet been explicitly diagnosed with a men-
tal disorder [14–17]. Young maltreated children display
impairments with regard to several indices of mentaliz-
ing: (a) they engage in less symbolic and less child-
initiated dyadic play [18, 19]; (b) they sometimes fail to
show empathy when witnessing distress in other chil-
dren [20]; (c) they have poor affect regulation, which
contributes to psychopathology and peer rejection in
later life [21–24]; importantly, (d) they make fewer refer-
ences to their internal states [25]; and (e) they struggle
to understand emotional expressions, particularly facial
expressions [26, 27]; this latter feature has been observed
even in studies that controlled for verbal IQ [28, 29].
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The impact of maltreatment reaches into adulthood. A
large-scale study of 5000 adults [30] found that maltreat-
ment by parents in childhood was strongly associated
with adult variations in theory of mind, or mental-state
inferencing, as well as self-reported levels of social affili-
ation (social motivation and social support). Interest-
ingly, this study found that face discrimination and face
memory abilities in adulthood were relatively unaffected
by early adversity. The findings confirm that social cog-
nition may be the domain that it is particularly vulner-
able to the effects of adverse childhood environments.
Impairments in epistemic trust are a further, and per-
haps more damaging, long-term sequel of the experience
of childhood maltreatment. Epistemic hypervigilance can
manifest as the overinterpretation of motives, which can
take the form of hypermentalizing [31, 32], or pseudo-
mentalizing [33]. There is significant evidence that the
quality of the relationship of a child to a given commu-
nicator determines the extent to which they acquire and
generalize information from that communicator [34–36].
When in a state of epistemic hypervigilance, the recipi-
ent of a communication assumes that the communica-
tor’s intentions are other than those declared, and the
information is therefore not treated as being from a def-
erential source. Most typically, epistemic mistrust mani-
fests as the misattribution of intention and the
assumption of malevolent motives behind another per-
son’s actions, and therefore treating them with epistemic
hypervigilance (or conversely, in some instances, exces-
sive inappropriate epistemic trust). There is evidence to
suggest that a hypermentalizing stance is more charac-
teristic of BPD in adolescence [31, 32]. It is possible that
this hypermentalizing typically subsides into a flatter
profile of outright epistemic mistrust as the individual
matures. We speculate that this pattern may partially ac-
count for the common life-course history of BPD symp-
toms, which demonstrates a reduction in impulsive
symptoms over time but no lessening of the affective
and social symptoms associated with BPD.
In a state of epistemic mistrust, the recipient of social
communication may well understand what is being
expressed to him/her, but he/she cannot encode it as
relevant, internalize it, and appropriately reapply it. The
consequence is that the regular process of modifying
one’s stable beliefs about the world in response to social
communication is closed down or disrupted. This gener-
ates the quality of rigidity and being ‘hard to reach’ that
therapists have often described in their work in the field
of PD [37]. Change cannot happen in the therapeutic
setting because, although the patient can hear and
understand the communications transmitted to them by
the therapist, the information cannot be accepted as
relevant to them and generalizable to other social con-
texts. The persistent distress and social dysfunction
associated with PDs is the result of the destruction of
epistemic trust in social knowledge of most kinds.
PD may therefore be best understood as a failure of
communication arising from a breakdown in the cap-
acity to forge learning relationships. We believe that
this quality underlies the painful sense of isolation
that characterizes the subjective experience of an
individual with BPD.
Reconsidering the role of attachment
The change of emphasis in relation to the role of attach-
ment theory in the aetiology of PD we will consider in
this section speaks to some of the long-standing criti-
cisms of attachment theory that emerged from two
directions: psychoanalysis and anthropology. The psy-
choanalytic criticism of attachment has tended to take
the position that attachment theory is too mechanistic
and reductionist; that its broad classifications leave
attachment unable to engage with the subtlety and com-
plexity of individual human subjectivity. These argu-
ments have been well rehearsed [38, 39]. Meanwhile,
anthropologists have suggested that attachment theory
disallows other kinds of complexity: those that arrive
from cultural differences and varying environmental im-
peratives. Varying contexts might indeed generate differ-
ent family configurations and caregiving expectations
and structure, for example, alloparenting [40]. As an-
other example, the fluid capacity of caregivers to attach,
disengage and reattach across their lives has been com-
pellingly described by the anthropologist Scheper-
Hughes in her work on mothering in an acutely impo-
verished milieu, where she observed mothers facing the
death of their infants with apparently little sorrow, but
become loving mothers to subsequent children or chil-
dren who, having previously been given up on, went on
to survive [41]. Similarly, historians have traced high
rates of infanticide in many cultures (30–40% in early
19th century Milan, for example [42]). Indeed, early his-
torians of childhood, such as Philippe Ariès [43] and
Lawrence Stone [44], characterized it as a state of unre-
mitting abuse and brutality. Stone argued that the high
levels of infant and child mortality in the pre-industrial
era precluded the investment of love and affection in
children that we would now consider normative [44].
More recently, this depiction of the experiences of chil-
dren in the past has been displaced by a more subtle
and complex portrait of how parents have historically
perceived and related to their children [45]. Ample ex-
amples have been found of the ways in which children
were recognized, loved, protected and mourned for by
their caregivers (e.g. [46, 47]). These academic skir-
mishes over the sameness and difference of being a
parent and a child across time, and the co-existence of
love and violence in human experience, should not
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surprise us from a clinical point of view: they are in
keeping with our understanding of attachment as a uni-
versal human (and indeed mammalian) instinct, while
still allowing us to recognize, for example, the high rates
of infanticide that historians have traced in some periods
[42]. In all but the most cases extreme childrearing
scenarios, attachments of some style do form; but it is
possible that different social environments are likely to
trigger different attachment styles as being more adap-
tive to each environment.
The attachment style to which the child is exposed
may be protective of the child, even if it is harsh or
cruel. We thus suggest that attachment styles are them-
selves one piece of social communication that the famil-
ial context is promoting about the most effective way to
function in the prevailing culture. Attachment is part of
a social signalling system telling the infant or young
child to prioritize developing specific mentalizing capaci-
ties and particular patterns of behaviour. The family
environment associated with BPD may entail triggering
a particular style of adaptation to ensure survival to
reproduction, albeit one that causes pain to the individ-
ual and is challenging to the immediately surrounding
environment. For example, risky sexual behaviour in ad-
olescents with a childhood history of neglect may be a
way of increasing the likelihood that they will contribute
to the gene pool. Such behaviours are resistant to change
because the adaptation is triggered by natural selection;
the individual’s genes ‘communicate’ that this is most
likely to ensure survival (of the genome) [48]. Lower
levels of mentalizing, greater aggressiveness and higher
sensitivity to perceived threats may be adaptive re-
sponses to certain cultural environments. Natural selec-
tion has charged families with psychologically
enculturating their children to maximize their likelihood
of survival. Social learning from the immediate family
and culture can help us account for the relationship be-
tween individual behaviours and the culture that engen-
ders them. Low levels of interpersonal understanding, or
even frank attacks on the self-awareness of individual
family members, may be biologically successful, evolu-
tionarily selected strategies. A stance of dismissing at-
tachment and non-mentalizing is not experienced as a
deficit by the person adopting this stance, but rather as
the most appropriate strategy to ensure their survival. It
further follows that if mentalizing interventions are to
succeed with children, they need to occur in the context
of the family [33] and enhance the quality of mentalizing
within the family system to which children are oriented
to acquire social expectations.
At a theoretical level, this change in focus involves a
certain reconfiguration of the role of attachment in de-
velopmental psychopathology. Like other authors [49],
we have previously placed considerable weight on the
nature of attachment disorganization in our accounts of
BPD based on the mentalizing model [50]. We maintain
that the role of attachment is highly significant in the
developmental origins of PD. However, we argue that its
role might perhaps be best understood as only one
(albeit very important) form of content learned from the
social environment. This is congruent with recent work
suggesting that the relationship between infant attach-
ment status and later outcomes is more complicated
than that suggested by early attachment studies [51].
Other findings have suggested limited evidence for link-
ing childrearing environments to later outcomes and the
fluctuating significance of infant attachment style across
the life trajectory. For example, in infancy, the role of
genes in determining security or insecurity of attach-
ment is negligible and the childrearing environment is
critical [52]; however, in adolescence, the impact of gen-
etic factors rises considerably, such that they predict 38
and 35% of security and insecurity, respectively [51].
Meanwhile, parental sensitivity – previously considered
key for the transmission of attachment security in in-
fancy (see a major meta-analysis by Verhage et al. [53])
– may have other functions beyond ensuring secure at-
tachment, although this function is, of course, an im-
portant one. The relationship between parental
sensitivity and developmental outcomes, according to re-
cent and highly compelling findings by Kok et al. [54],
may be more general and structural than can be cap-
tured by infant attachment status: these findings indicate
that normal variation in maternal sensitivity is related to
markers of optimal brain development. This suggests
that the parenting environment supports the neurobio-
logical architecture of higher-order cognitive function
upon which the capacity to mentalize depends.
We suggest that the relationship between parental sen-
sitivity, attachment and epistemic trust lies in the way in
which epistemic trust in most normal circumstances de-
velops in the context of attachment relationships. Secure
attachment, which provides mostly consistent contingent
parental responses to the child, also provides mostly
consistent ostensive cueing and therefore the most fer-
tile ground in which epistemic trust can emerge and
subsequently generalize to new relationships. This, of
course, follows Bowlby’s description of internal working
models [55]. Attachment to a safe, sufficiently reliable
and mentalizing caregiver provides the child with a sense
of agency that allows the child to have some confidence
both in their own interpretation of the social world, and
in the good faith and general accuracy of their care-
givers’ communications [56].
The role of attachment in our conception of personal-
ity has shifted as we have increasingly come to regard
the conceptualization of linear causation in psychopath-
ology as unhelpful; instead, we conceptualize the
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perpetuation of PD being driven by loosely coupled
interacting systems working in a circular way. A linear
approach would posit that the capacity for mentalizing is
vulnerable because of the social-emotional quality of
early attachment experiences; partial, erratic mentalizing
turns into an interpersonal vulnerability whereby a per-
son feels interpersonally brittle because they cannot reli-
ably process the psychological meaning of social
experience, and vulnerable because they cannot process
their own emotional reactions to these experiences.
Evidence suggests that attachment stress derails men-
talizing judgments [57]; working in the other direction,
attachment schemas predict mentalizing in adolescence
[58, 59]. According to this model, mentalizing and emo-
tional regulation compete, and attachment insecurity has
a catalytic role in disrupting the development of optimal
mentalizing capacity.
Mentalizing difficulties lead to affect dysregulation,
which in turn further disrupts mentalizing. Wherever
this cycle starts, mentalizing problems lead to interper-
sonal conflict and social difficulties, which generate in-
tense (social) affect such as shame, which is inadequately
contextualized because of the failure of social cognition.
This affect further undermines the capacity to mentalize,
which can then create further social challenges, generat-
ing interpersonal conflict that will inevitably lead to
higher emotional arousal. The emotional arousal is
poorly modulated and causes further disruptions of so-
cial cognition as part of a recursive process, the final
outcome of which is an individual lacking the higher-
order cognitive capacity necessary to withstand even
everyday social adversity.
The likely interaction between a history of adversity
that challenges epistemic trust and mentalizing failure as
both a cause and a consequence of emotion dysregula-
tion culminates in a stance where the individual with
limited mentalizing capacity cannot reliably detect os-
tensive cueing and adopts what is perceived to be a mal-
adaptive pattern of rigidity – that is, inability to change.
What emerges is an (implicit) attitude of mistrust in the
social environment [60] and an incapacity to learn from
social experience or to modify one’s behaviour on the
basis of social learning. In our view, these individuals are
those with high ‘p’ scores whose disorders persist be-
cause of their inaccessibility to normalizing social influ-
ence. Their ‘impermeability’ to therapeutic influence
comes not from the deep-seatedness of the pattern but
its central manifestation of epistemic mistrust born of a
dual core of a history of adversity and emotionally dis-
rupted sensitivity to ostension. This is not a naive envir-
onmental theory promoting the quality of social
interaction at the expense of biological factors: there is
every reason to suspect that genetic predisposition, as
well as the normal mixture of early environmental
determinants, makes an individual more or less receptive
to ostensive cues. The fact that therapeutic interventions
have the capacity to promote sensitivity to ostensive
cues in no way prejudges the balance of biological versus
psychosocial influences on sensitivity to social cues.
Because clinicians have historically linked non-
responsiveness to therapeutic intervention to character-
istics of their patient rather than features of their own
relationship to the patient, the pattern of epistemic mis-
trust/hypervigilance was regarded as a feature of the
most stable system they could identify in their patient –
their personality. As ‘normal’ personality is in fact far
from stable, consistent or unmalleable in relation to so-
cial situations [61, 62], perhaps disorders of personality
are so called because, unlike normal personality, individ-
uals with PDs have in common an absence of flexibility
and great difficulty in adapting to changing social situa-
tions. Hence, epistemic mistrust may have its roots in
part in disturbed attachment experiences, but ultimately
it is a disorder of social communication or social learn-
ing. Its core is a compromised capacity for appropriately
interpreting social actions in terms of mental states,
which is what normally bolsters resilience, leaving the
individual with dysfunctional social learning systems that
are inadequate to assure adaptation in the face of ‘nor-
mal’ adversity.
Although this perspective has considerable bearing on
our understanding of the subjective experience of BPD,
it is also one that is consistent with a conceptualization
of the human mind as having evolved to be highly social
and culturally responsive. Therefore, it is a theory that is
relevant to how we think about the relationship between
the individual and culture, and it is of relevance to a
much broader and more interdisciplinary way of think-
ing than our previous position was. This rather more
systemic, less intrapsychic approach involves a reposi-
tioning of the role of attachment in developmental psy-
chopathology to accommodate the imperatives of the
wider social environment within which the dyadic rela-
tionship is located. The anthropologist Thomas Weisner
expressed it thus:
The question that is important for many, if not
most, parents and communities is not, “Is [this
individual] child ‘securely attached?’” but rather,
“How can I ensure that my child knows whom
to trust and how to share appropriate social
connections to others? How can I be sure my child
is with others and situations where he or she will
be safe.” Parents are concerned that the child
learns culturally appropriate social behaviours that
display proper social and emotional comportment
and also show trust in appropriate other people.
([63], p. 263)
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Our thinking has – albeit from a different direction –
come to a similar conclusion.
The role of systems
If the lack of resilience we associate with BPD is to be
understood as an inability to access positive appraisal
and the inhibition mechanisms owing to imbalances in
mentalizing and the associated compromise of epistemic
trust, this also has implications for the system inhabited
by that individual. As outlined earlier, we suggest that
‘personality’ dysfunction persists through the self-
perpetuating cycle of social dysfunction and mentalizing
difficulties. The resulting heightened affect disrupts the
interpersonal environment, creating social challenges
that derail mentalizing and in turn undermine social
functioning.
A graphical display may help to illustrate these com-
plex interactions (see Fig. 1). Emotion dysregulation,
disrupted attachment histories and the disorganized
insecure attachment system interact to generate social/
interpersonal dysfunction, a shared characteristic of PDs
[64, 65]. Such dysfunctions are best understood as
communication failures rather than as properties or
characteristics of the individual suffering from PD.
The failure of communication occurs at a number of
levels. First, the social disruption associated with inter-
personal conflict will itself compromise the processes of
social learning and, in particular, of salutogenesis (the
capacity to learn and benefit from the (social) environ-
ment). This is a systemic failure of communication that
may characterize a family, the members of a social group
such as a gang, a social subculture, or indeed an entire
culture. We will discuss such systemic failures in more
detail below in terms of their impact on the network of
social influence within which all socialization occurs.
Second, the loss of balanced mentalizing triggered by
interpersonal conflict generally lessens interest in the
content of communication and social information
exchange. There is a pervasive loss of interest in
intentionality; observable outcomes are gradually priori-
tized as indicators of attitudes and the general tenor
of verbal communication is perceived as meaningless
‘psychobabble’ with few or no substantive implications
for the life of the individual.
Third, social dysfunction, as well as the misinterpret-
ation of social signals associated with the loss of menta-
lizing, leads to a probable failure to appropriately
identify ostension – the sense that a communication is
of personal relevance.
These factors (and probably many others) contribute
to the individual’s failure to develop epistemic trust in
personally relevant communications. Again, we are keen
to point out that this is not inherently a maladaptive
process. The failure to develop epistemic trust leaves the
natural function of epistemic vigilance in place. It is in
fact an efficient adaptation and an indication that the
individual is exercising appropriate caution in relation to
social influence, which we see as manifesting in the
undesirable persistence of antisocial expectations or
schemata and the individual’s relative imperviousness to
social influence.
However, the absence of epistemic trust sets a limit
upon social learning. This can render the individual
increasingly ill-suited to function effectively within their
Fig. 1 The Natural Pedagogy Model of Personality Disorder. Illustrates the interactions between social dysfunction, failure in social communication,
epistemic mistrust, and imperviousness to social influence that underpin personality disorder. Emotion dysregulation, disrupted attachment histories
and the disorganized insecure attachment system generate social/interpersonal dysfunction. This undermines accurate social communication, causing
social disruption, the misinterpretation of social signals, and difficulty in recognising ostensive cues from others. These difficulties in the area of social
communication can give rise to epistemic mistrust in relation to the social environment. This is not inherently a maladaptive process: epistemic
vigilance has a natural function. However, the absence of epistemic trust sets a limit upon social learning. This can render the individual potentially
unable to function effectively within their social environment and can lead to further disruption in the social network, leaving the individual
increasingly isolated and prone to further social/interpersonal dysfunction
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social environment. Disruption of the social network
within which the individual could (or perhaps should)
function leaves them increasingly isolated and prone to
further social/interpersonal dysfunction.
There are many levels at which systemic thinking ap-
plies to how we respond to PD. In terms of clinical
work, a mentalizing team around the therapist is, we
argue, essential for maintaining good practice. In the
context of the persistent distress associated with PD,
clinical encounters happen, by necessity, against the
background of constant exposure to psychic equivalence
and pretend or teleological modes [33, 66]. We suggest
that it is the impact of non-mentalizing on the system of
social communication, and not the unchangeability of
non-mentalizing per se, that makes PDs clinically chal-
lenging conditions. One of the defining characteristics of
PD is that the patterns of social dysfunction shown by
the patient are enduring. Indeed, as mentioned above,
BPD in particular has traditionally been regarded as an
almost untreatable condition; this is one of the factors
that have contributed to the stigma experienced by those
receiving a PD diagnosis. However, effective therapies
for BPD now exist: at least nine forms of treatment have
been tested in at least 20 randomized controlled trials
[67], and patients with BPD should no longer be
regarded as ‘unhelpable’. We would argue that the
apparent inconsistency that a condition has long been
believed to be untreatable, yet appears to be more
responsive to therapy than most mental disorders, is to
be found to lie in the way the non-mentalizing actions
of BPD patients can create non-mentalizing social
systems that sustain their condition – including in the
consulting room. We suggest that it is unrealistic to
expect a clinician working with such patients to themself
maintain an effective mentalizing stance in the medium
to long term if they are not supported adequately to
maintain their capacity to mentalize, ideally by a sur-
rounding team that is not directly exposed to (and is thus
protected from) the patient’s dysfunctional social system.
Systemic interventions may be required to address
these problems [68]. In principle, the patient and therap-
ist are isolated in a room, albeit with bidirectional social
influence – the therapist is, after all, in a position to
enhance the patient’s capacity to reflect, to question and
to focus simultaneously on both other and self, inside
and outside. But the reality is that the therapist becomes
embedded within the patient’s social survival mechan-
ism, which subsumes the obliteration of balanced
mentalizing (normally erring on the side of being unre-
flective, externally focused, emotional and dominated by
resonance rather than reflectiveness). The clinician’s
mentalizing, even if exceptional, is unlikely to be suffi-
cient to be able to deal with such highly intense emo-
tional situations and conflicts. Therapists require their
own system of support relationships, primarily from
other clinicians, in order to scaffold their capacity to
mentalize and facilitate epistemic trust.
The self-perpetuating cycle of sustained dysfunction
associated with BPD and a non-mentalizing social sys-
tem reminds us of the international variability in the
prevalence of BPD. It has been observed that BPD is less
common in non-Western societies, possibly as a result
of the fact that the lack of social capital and community
support characteristic of many modern or modernizing
societies leaves the individual more vulnerable to impul-
sivity and affective instability [69]. Available prevalence
data suggest that Western countries with higher levels of
inequality of wealth experience higher rates of BPD [70].
The anomie of modern life – that is, a lack of social
connectiveness leading to dysregulation –described by
Durkheim [71], and connected by other authors with the
conditions that might account for national variations in
BPD [69], can be read as a description of a systemic
collapse of epistemic trust. This emphasis on the role of
the social environment points to the value of thinking
about ways in which a social climate can be encouraged
to become more mentalizing to support a change
process. Families are one obvious example of a systemic
arena for the promotion of mentalizing that reinforces
the learning of epistemic trust. Bateman and colleagues’
development of the Families and Carers Training and
Support programme (FACTS) for those supporting a
family member with BPD is one example of a mentaliz-
ing intervention for the family [72].
The school is another system that seems ideal as the
site for mentalizing interventions. Tellingly, evidence
suggests that, of the many interventions that now exist
to deal with bullying in schools, the most effective share
the characteristic of involving the whole school [73]. A
mentalizing-based approach, known as Creating a
Peaceful School Environment (CAPSLE), is one of
three bullying prevention strategies found by a large
meta-analysis to be most effective [74] (the other two
programmes were the Olweus Bully Prevention Pro-
gram, whose generalizability has recently been ques-
tioned by Bradshaw [75], and Finland’s KiVa national
anti-bullying program [76]). The mentalizing approach
of CAPSLE is a systemic one, which seeks to create a
mentalizing climate and a group dynamic that can re-
sist and limit the potency and currency carried by the
individual acts of violence or aggression that are inev-
itable in a school [77–80].
AMBIT (adaptive mentalization-based integrative ther-
apy) is a third example of a clinical approach that com-
bines mentalizing with thinking about the systems that
surround an individual [81, 82]. Originally developed for
‘hard-to-reach’ adolescents with complex needs, AMBIT
is now being applied to younger and older client groups.
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Such clients present with multifaceted difficulties and
so tend to attract complicated multi-agency and
multi-professional networks aiming to provide help.
At the same time, these clients tend to be highly
alienated from conventional social networks, while
often forming personal relationships that carry further
risks. AMBIT seeks to counter these difficulties by
using a main keyworker to, where possible, simplify
the individual’s experience of the complex network
that surrounds them. The keyworker simultaneously
seeks to support and encourage the non-professional
social networks that surround the individual (e.g. the
family, friendship groups or extra-curricular/activity-
based groups), while also serving as a secure attach-
ment base from which the individual might explore
the social opportunities their environment presents. A
final crucial component of this approach is its em-
phasis on the need for a supportive mentalizing sys-
tem around the keyworker, given the anxieties and
pressures involved in such therapeutic work.
The systemic mentalization-based interventions out-
lined above have in common their view of the individual
as being temporarily separated from their social net-
work, and of their capacity to form bonds of trust being
shaky and prone to disruption. Without intervention,
the person loses their epistemic safety net; the socially
defined network of meanings is under threat. The inter-
ventions address the network, not just the individual or
the therapist. In AMBIT, the links between the keywor-
ker and the ‘dis-integrating’ (the term used in AMBIT to
indicate the frequency with which the various agencies
around a client may pull in opposite directions in their
various attempts to work with the client) social care sys-
tem around the family are an important focus. In
CAPSLE, the non-mentalizing bully–victim–bystander is
focused on by everyone within the whole school. FACTS
aims to address the non-mentalizing within the family
system. Common to each of these approaches is its cap-
acity to ensure that epistemic trust – the meaningful
transfer of information from one person to the other –
is ultimately assured and protected. It is evident in
CAPSLE where the disruption of epistemic function
makes the intervention necessary; indeed, one of the
outcome measures for this intervention is the improve-
ment of children’s scores in standardized assessments of
educational attainment [79]. In AMBIT, meaningful
communication between different helping systems is
resumed with the restoration of mentalizing. Similarly,
in FACTS, with improved mentalizing the family can
once again take up its function of social information
transmission. It is in our opinion thus not mentalizing
itself that is of direct benefit; it is the normal social
functions that depend on mentalizing that bring the real
therapeutic benefit.
Non-mentalizing social systems present a powerful
cue that the individual is in an environment where
social relations are not operating on the principle of
shared goals, cooperation and interdependence. It is
these behavioural imperatives that are, as Tomasello
described, associated with our higher-order cognitive
capacities [83]. When presented with cues that signify
that we do not have access to collaborative social re-
lations, we make cognitive adjustments, as evidenced
by new research on Social Baseline Theory [84]. As a
simple illustration, hills are judged to be less steep
when one is standing next to a friend, and there is a
dose–response effect: the longer the friendship, the
less steep the hill appears to be [84, 85]. Coan et al.
state that ‘The human brain expects access to rela-
tionships characterized by interdependence, shared
goals, and joint attention’ ([84], p. 87). Violations of
this increase stress and increase cognitive and physio-
logical effort – ‘social relationships decrease the pre-
dicted cost of the environment’ ([84], p. 87). Social
behaviour is so closely at the heart of the human evo-
lutionary story that it is a fundamental instrument
that humans use to ‘mitigate risk and diminish the
level of effort needed to accomplish goals’ ([84], p.
87). In the absence of this social baseline, the envir-
onment is perceived to be more risky and costly in
terms of effort. The accessibility of social support is
one of the factors that humans – and other social an-
imals – use in adjusting their appraisal bias.
Literature relating to research in non-human ani-
mals shows that the capacity of an organism to regu-
late its internal state according to evaluations of the
external conditions (rather than through basic stimu-
lus–response mechanisms) is fundamental to behav-
ioural flexibility; it has been recently suggested that
appraisal theory can be fruitfully brought into this
thinking [86]. In particular, it has been suggested that
cognitive biases arising from the interference of
affective states, as well as genetic and environmental
factors, can affect the appraisal of ambiguous situa-
tions, which subsequently shapes resilience to stress-
ful events [86]. One example is Harding and
colleagues’ classic finding that rats exposed to un-
stable housing conditions made more pessimistic
evaluations of ambiguous stimuli, in a way that is
similar to how anxious or depressed people tend to
make negative judgments about ambiguous stimuli
[87]. Whereas previously, as attachment theorists, we
may have made sense of the relationship between be-
havioural flexibility, social stimuli and appraisal in
terms of internal working models, we now suggest
that epistemic trust is the mechanism via which
humans’ behavioural flexibility arising from appraisals
becomes compromised.
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Implications for prevention and intervention
Different approaches to BPD from a theoretical and
practical point of view appear to be embarrassingly
similar in terms of outcome [88, 89] in BPD. Based
on the considerations outlined in this paper, we sug-
gest that all effective treatments of BPD involve the
same structure, namely that the re-emergence of
epistemic trust requires three initially sequentially
implemented but, as treatments unfold, increasingly
concurrent forms of communication.
Communication system 1
This entails the communication of therapeutic
model-based content that indicates to the patient
that the therapist has considerable knowledge as well
as personal characteristics that may be highly valued
by the patient. The knowledge communicated will
naturally vary according to the treatment model (e.g.
Transference Focused Psychotherapy will communi-
cate information about primarily subtle intrapsychic
relationships, while Dialectical Behavior Therapy will
offer broader psychological constructs and coping
strategies). Content analysis of all effective treatments
reveal that the relationship of therapist and patient is
supported by the former conveying a convincing un-
derstanding of the patient as an intentional agent
which generates a sense of self-recognition. All
evidence-based models of psychotherapy present
models of mind, disorder and change that are accur-
ate, helpful to patients and increase patients’ capacity
for understanding. However, they also need to over-
come the epistemic hypervigilance (‘not true’, ‘not
relevant to me’) presented by the patient. So, besides
the content, this stage involves a subtle and rich
process of ostensive cueing. Thus, even at this rela-
tively early stage the therapist must present their
information with mentalizing in mind, establishing collab-
oration with the patient, demonstrating that they see the
patient’s problems from their perspective, recognizing
them as an agent, and with the attitude that the patient
has things to teach the therapist. Through this, the therap-
ist responds contingently to the patient. From the struc-
tural perspective we are presenting here, the therapist’s
attempt to apply his/her model to interactions with the
patient serves as an ostensive cue, which increases the pa-
tient’s epistemic trust and thus acts as a catalyst for thera-
peutic success. It does so to the extent that (a) the
therapist is able to find and effectively transmit content
that provides valuable ways for the patient to understand
(mentalize) themselves and their reaction to others, and
(b) the process of transmission involves the patient recog-
nizing the truth and personal relevance of the content, so
they become able to relax their epistemic mistrust.
Communication system 2
Mentalizing may be a common factor in effective psycho-
therapies, but not in the sense that we originally intended
[90]. It is not that, regardless of the therapeutic model, pa-
tients learn the ‘Esperanto’ of mentalizing, or even the
altogether more appealing discourse of ‘plain old therapy’
[91]. The constant engagement of the patient by the ther-
apist has several key features that are relevant to the res-
toration of epistemic trust. First, the therapist consistently
recognizes the patient’s agentiveness, focuses on him/her
as an actor and negotiates from the perspective of the pa-
tient’s self. Second, by marking the patient’s experiences,
the therapist acknowledges the patient’s emotional state.
Third, the therapist makes extensive use of ostensive cues
to denote the personal relevance of the information trans-
mitted and its generalizable social value. By mentalizing
the patient effectively, the therapist models mentalizing,
creating an open and trustworthy environment with low
arousal. Structurally, a ‘virtuous cycle’ is put into motion:
the therapist responds sensitively to the patient, the pa-
tient takes a step back from epistemic isolation, and the
patient gradually begins to exercise his/her mentalizing
skills, which, step by step, extend from the confines of the
therapeutic context and generalize to his/her wider social
context. This elicits an emotional reaction by the patient
to the social context, giving the therapist further oppor-
tunity to respond sensitively. This process involves a com-
plex and non-linear progression. Improving mentalizing is
not its main goal, but the improved mentalizing that re-
sults from it enables the patient to start to approach and
learn from their wider social context. Answering the ques-
tion of why patients with a better capacity for mentalizing
improve more in psychotherapy than those whose menta-
lizing is poorer helps us to understand the process.
Mentalizing moderates the impact of therapeutic commu-
nications: a poorly mentalizing patient will frequently in-
terpret the therapist’s ostensive cues erroneously, and
epistemic trust is thus not established. With improved
mentalizing, the therapist’s communications are appreci-
ated and interpreted as trustworthy – and have the
intended influence on the patient. The experience of
having one’s subjectivity understood – of being mentalized
– is a necessary trigger for being able to receive and learn
from the social knowledge that has the potential to change
one’s perception of oneself and the social world. The ‘gift’
of a mentalizing process in psychotherapy is to open up or
restore the patient’s receptivity to broader social influence,
which is a precondition for social learning and healthy de-
velopment at any age.
Communication system 3
The greatest benefit from a therapeutic relationship
comes from the generalizing of epistemic trust beyond
therapy, such that the patient can continue to learn and
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grow from other relationships. Social learning in the
context of epistemic trust is (re)established, and this
leads to salutogenesis. The third communication system
is a process of opening the person’s mind via establishing
epistemic trust (collaboration) so he/she can once again
trust the social world by changing his/her expectations
of it. This means that it is not just what is taught in
therapy that helps the patient, but that the patient’s cap-
acity for learning from social situations is rekindled.
Enhanced mentalizing allows the patient to achieve
improved social relationships and recognize who is a
reliable and trustworthy source of information – that is,
who one can ‘be friends with’. The improved epistemic
trust and abandonment of rigidity enables learning from
experience once again. So, therapeutic change is prob-
ably a consequence of how the patient comes to use
their social environment, and not to what happens in
therapy per se. The benefits of therapy remain contin-
gent on what is accessible to patients in their particular
social world. Therapeutic interventions are effective
because they open the patient to social learning experi-
ences which feed back in a virtuous cycle. If the environ-
ment is at least partly benign, therapy will ‘work’.
This third system – social learning in the context of
epistemic trust – is, according to our thinking, the
mechanism at work in the circular and self-perpetuating
relationship between BPD and the social context. The
conceptualization of the three communication systems
outlined here involves an acknowledgment of the inher-
ent limitations of clinical interventions in cases where
the patient’s wider social environment does not support
mentalizing. The implication of this is that what happens
in any therapeutic intervention cannot on its own be
expected to be enough to bring about any lasting signifi-
cant improvement in the patient’s state. Indeed, in
certain circumstances it would be maladaptive for the
individual to develop epistemic trust and lower their
social defences – for instance, in social environments
characterized by high levels of aggression or violence, in
which an external, non-reflective, rapidly responding
affective focus on others as opposed to the self would be
better prioritized as a survival strategy.
Conclusions
Several features of the theoretical approach presented in
this paper await further empirical confirmation, but ac-
cording to the theory of epistemic trust and social learn-
ing, the lack of resilience, or positive appraisal,
characteristic of individuals with BPD may be, in a sense,
mislabelling. It may be more accurate to characterize
BPD as an ‘emergency mode’ form of social understand-
ing in which epistemic hypervigilance, distrust, or out-
right epistemic freezing is an adaptive consequence to
the individual’s social environment. For various possible
reasons, the individual has adopted negative appraisal
mechanisms as a default. This is a highly socially ori-
ented perspective on personal psychopathology. The key
argument is that BPD (or other manifestations of the ab-
sence of psychological resilience) is the outcome of the
ways in which the individual has learned to respond to
the transmission of social knowledge within their own
social environment.
Future research is needed to investigate these assump-
tions in more detail. This may also lead to the develop-
ment of new prevention and intervention strategies,
which are urgently needed, particularly given the
increasing recognition of the need for prevention strat-
egies for BPD [92, 93].
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